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Abstract
The paper considers approval voting for a large population of vot-
ers. It is proven that, based on statistical information about candidate
scores, rational voters vote sincerly and according to a simple behav-
ioral rule. It is also proven that if a Condorcet-winner exists, this can-
didate is elected.
∗Thanks to Steve Brams, Nicolas Gravel, François Maniquet, Remzi Sanver and Karine
Van der Straeten for their remarks. Errors are mine.
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1 Introduction
Approval Voting (AV) is the method of election according to which a voter
can vote for as many candidates as she wishes, the elected candidate being
the one who receives the most votes. In this paper two results are established
about AV in the case of a large electorate when voters behave strategically:
the sincerity of individual behavior (rational voters choose sincere ballots)
and the Condorcet-consistency of the choice function defined by approval
voting (whenever a Condorcet winner exists, it is the outcome of the vote).
Under AV, a ballot is a subset of the set candidates. A ballot is said
to be sincere, for a voter, if it shows no “hole” with respect to the voter’s
preference ranking; if the voter sincerely approves of a candidate x she also
approves of any candidate she prefers to x. Therefore, under AV, a voter has
several sincere ballots at her disposal: she can vote for her most preferred
candidate, or for her two, or three, or more most preferred candidates.1
It has been found by Brams and Fishburn (1983) that a voter should
always vote for her most-preferred candidate and never vote for her least-
preferred one. Notice that this observation implies that strategic voting is
sincere in the case of three candidates. The debate about strategic voting
under AV was made vivid by a paper by Niemi (1984). Niemi argued that,
because there is more than one sincere approval ballot, the rule “almost
begs the voter to think and behave strategically, driving the voter away
from honest behavior” (Niemi’s emphasis, p. 953). Niemi then gave some
examples showing that an approval game cannot be solved in dominant
strategies. Brams and Fishburn (1985), responded to this view, but the
debate was limited by the very few results available about equilibria of voting
games in general and strategic approval voting in particular.
For instance in one chapter of their book, Brams and Fishburn discuss
the importance of pre-election polls. They give an example to prove that,
under AV, adjustment caused by continual polling can have various eﬀect
and lead to cycling even when a Condorcet winner exists (example 7, p.120).
But with no defined notion of rational behavior they have to postulate spe-
cific (and changing) adjustment behavior from the voters.
With the postulate that voters use sincere and undominated (“admissi-
ble”) strategies but can use any of these, Brams and Sanver (2003) describe
the set of possible winners of an AV election. They conclude that a plethora
1While some scholars see this feature as a drawback (Saari and Van Newenhizen, 1988),
observation shows that people appreciate to have this degree of freedom: see Laslier and
Van der Straeten (2006) for an experiment, and the survey Brams and Fishburn (2005)
on the practice of AV.
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of candidates pass this test.
This literature assumes that voters are only interested in the elected can-
didate and not on how many votes are obtained by the other candidates (no
expressive voting) and the present paper will not depart from this standard
assumption. But none of the above approaches uses an equilibrium theory
of approval voting. The rationality hypothesis in a voting situation without
expressive voting may have odd implications. For instance it implies that
a voter is indiﬀerent between all her strategies as soon as her votes cannot
change the result of the election. As a consequence, in an election held un-
der plurality or AV rule, any situation in which one candidate is slightly
(three votes) ahead of the others is trivially a Nash equilibrium. It is fair to
say that with many voters, in most voting situations, the Nash equilibrium
concept is a powerless tool.
Taking a standard game-theoretical point of view, De Sinopoli, Dutta
and Laslier (2006) have studied in details examples of AV games. They
showed that even powerful refinement considerations such as strategic sta-
bility or regularity could not guarantee the election of a Condorcet winner
when it exists nor exclude insincere behavior at equilibrium.
All these results are essentially negative ones, in the sense that this lit-
erature makes almost no prediction for AV games. A breakthrough in the
rational theory of voting occurred when it was realized that considering
large numbers of voters was technically possible and oﬀered a more realis-
tic account of political elections. This approach was pioneered by Myerson
and Weber (1993). In the same paper, AV and other rules are studied on
an example with three types of voters and three candidates (a Condorcet
cycle). Subsequent papers by Myerson improved the techniques and tackled
several problems in the theory of voting (Myerson 1998, 2000, 2002). For
instance, using the so-called Poisson-Myerson model of voter participation,
Myerson (2002) obtained that approval voting guarantees the choice of the
majoritarian outcome in the case where there are only two types of voters.
The present paper applies similar, but not identical, techniques to approval
voting with no restriction on the number of candidates or voter types.
The abstract theory of the refinement of Nash equilibrium considers
small perturbations in the choice of strategies or in the payoﬀs (“trem-
bling hand” and other perfection criteria, strategic stability). The Poisson-
Myerson model introduces uncertainty at the level of the number of players.
In the present paper, uncertainty is introduced in an other way. We suppose
that there is some small but strictly positive probability that each vote is
wrongly recorded. This probability is supposed to be independent of the
identity of the voter, of the candidates, and of the other voters’ vote. It
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should be interpreted as the probability of a technical mistake which is un-
avoidable when recording each individual vote. Referring to the controversial
election of the US president in November 2000, the term “Florida tremble”
was suggested to describe this hypothesis. This term rightly conveys the
idea that material mistakes exist in elections. Notice however that in our
model, with independence and a large number of voters, the mistakes in
fact introduce no bias in the election.
Rationality implies that a voter can decide of her vote by limiting her
conjecture to those events in which her vote is pivotal. In a large electorate,
this is a very rare event, and it may seem unrealistic that actual voters de-
duce their choices from implausible premises. One can wish that a positive
theory of the voter be more behavioral and less rational. This is a wise re-
mark in general, but in the case of approval voting, the rational response
turns out to be very simple. It can be described as follows. Let x1 be the can-
didate who the voter thinks is the most likely to win. The voter will approve
of any candidate she prefers to x1. She will never approve of a candidate
she prefers x1 to. To decide wether she will approve of x1 or not, she com-
pares x1 to the second most likely winner (the “most serious contender”).
This behavior recommends a sincere ballot and its implementation does not
require sophisticated computations, it only requires that the voters holds a
conjecture about which two candidates are to receive the most and second-
most votes. For reasons that will be transparent in the sequel, we term this
behavior the “lexicographic response.” Moreover, we will show that the lex-
icographic response is, in this case, identical to a well known “boundedly
rational” but psychologically sound behavior: the choice by sequetial elim-
ination theory of Tversky (1997a). The rational and the behavioral models
are here equivalent.2
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 de-
scribes all the essential features of the model. Section 3 informally describes
the main point in the argument. Section 4 contains the formal statements
and proofs of the results: the description of rational voting (Theorem 1) from
which we deduce sincerity (Corollary 1), and the description of equilibrium
approval scores (Theorem 2) from which we deduce Condorcet consistency
(Corollary 2). Some computations are provided in an Appendix.
2Coming back to Florida, the final certified margin of Bush against Gore was 537 votes
and it was often heard after the election that the 97,421 voters who voted for Ralph Nader
acted irrationally precisely because they failed to reason on the basis of the pivotal event
“Gore almost tie with Bush”.
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2 The model
Candidates and voters
Let X denote the finite set of candidates. We follow Myerson and We-
ber (1993) in considering that there exists a finite number of voter types
τ ∈ T . A voter of type τ evaluates the utility of the election of candidate
x ∈ X according to a von Neumann and Morgenstern utility index uτ (x). A
preference on X is a transitive and complete binary relation. In this paper,
for simplicity, all preferences are supposed to be strict: no voter is indif-
ferent between two candidates. Preferences are denoted in the usual way:
x Pτ y means that τ -voters prefer candidate x to candidate y, thus:
x Pτ y ⇐⇒ uτ (x) > uτ (y).
Notice that one has to assume utility functions besides preference re-
lations, because voters take decisions under uncertainty. But it turns out
that the obtained results can all be phrased in terms of preferences. That
is: It will be proven that rational behavior in the considered situation only
depends on preferences.
We wish to consider a large electorate. To do so, we consider a fixed
finite number n of voters and replicate this set n times in the following way.
Let pτ denotes the fraction of type-τ voters, with:X
τ∈T
pτ = 1.
In the n-fold replicate economy the number of type-τ voters is nvpτ and the
total number of voters is nv.
Voting
An approval voting ballot is just a subset of the set of candidates. The
relative approval score s(x) of candidate x is the fraction of the electorate
that approves of x. If all type-τ voters choose ballot Bτ ⊆ X, the score is
the sum of pτ over types τ such that x ∈ Bτ :
s(x) =
X
τ : x∈Bτ
pτ .
Here the number of votes in favor of x is nvs(x). Of course 0 ≤ s(x) ≤ 1,
but
P
x∈X s(x) is usually larger than 1.
Trembling Ballots
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We consider the following perturbations. For each voter and each can-
didate there is a probability ε > 0 that this vote is not recorded. This
probability is supposed to be small. Precisely, it will be suﬃcient to suppose
that ε < 1/v (independently of n). We also suppose that these mistakes oc-
curs independently of the voter, of the candidate, and of the voter approving
or not other candidates3. For candidate x and voter i, let ηi,x be equal to
1 with probability ε and to 0 with the complement probability, when the
(intended) number of votes for candidate x is nvs(x), the realized number
of votes is a random variable Sn(x). Denote by AV (i) the set of the nvs(x)
voters who approve of x, then:
Sn(x) =
X
i∈AV (x)
(1− ηi,x).
The random variable Sn(x) is binomial, with expected value and variance:
E[Sn(x)] = (1− ε)nvs(x)
V[Sn(x)] = ε(1− ε)nvs(x).
To get intuition about this model, denote by b(x) the realized score:
b(x) =
Sn(x)
nv
.
For n large, the central limit theorem implies that the random variable b(x)
is approximately normal. One can write:
b(x) Ã n→∞N (a(x), var) ,
a(x) = (1− ε)s(x),
var =
ε(1− ε)s(x)
nv
.
The expectation of b(x), denoted a(x), is just a linear transformation of
the score s(x), and a and s rank candidates the same way. The variance
of b(x) is decreasing as 1/n. It is therefore tempting to directly use this
continuous model and to define as “approval scores” independent Gaussian
variables N
³
a(x), ε(1−ε)s(x)nv
´
. This continuous model delivers some correct
qualitative intuition, but using it without care may also lead to mistaken
conclusion, as is shown in Appendix B.
3The model here diﬀers from Myerson-Poisson models, in which the population of
voters is uncertain. If uncertainty about candidate scores were to arise from uncertainty
about the population of voters, then errors would be correlated.
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3 The argument
In this section the main argument for the proof is informally stated.
More or less serious races
The elected candidate is one with highest score. Ties are resolved by a
fair lottery. Given a strategy profile and its score vector s, the most probable
event is that the candidate with highest score wins, but it may be the case
that mistakes are such that another candidate does, and it may be the case
that two (or more) candidates are so close that one vote can be decisive. In
what follows, it will be needed to evaluate the probabilities of some of these
events when the number of voters is large.
One ballot may have consequences on the result of the election only if the
two (or more) first ranked candidates have scores that are within one vote
of each other. The probability of such a pivotal event is small if n is large,
but some of these events are even much less probable than others. It will
be proved that three (or more)-way ties are negligible in front of two-way
ties, and that diﬀerent two-way ties are negligible one in front of the other
according to a simple lexicographic pattern: The most probable one is a tie
between candidates x1 and x2: that is the most “serious race”, the second
most serious race is x1 against x3, which is less serious than x1 against x4,
etc. Lemma 2 states this point precisely.
This observation turns out to be suﬃcient to infer rational behavior. A
rational voter will obey a simple heuristic and consider in a sequential way
the diﬀerent occurrences of her being pivotal, according to the magnitude
of these events.
Rational behavior and the Law of Lexicographic Maximization:
We will show that the rational behavior can be deduced from a simple
heuristic, which can be described as follows in very general terms. Let D
be a finite set of possible decisions and Ω = {ω1, ...,ωN} a finite partition
of events, with π the probability measure on Ω and u a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility. The maximization problem of a rational decision-maker
can be written
max
d∈D
NX
k=1
π(ωk) Eu(d,ωk),
where Eu(d,ωk) denotes the expected utility of decision d conditional on
event ωk. Suppose that π is such that, for 1 ≤ k < k0 ≤ N , the probability
π(ωk) is large compared to the probability π(ωk0):
π(ω1)À π(ω2)À ...À π(ωN).
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Then the above maximization problem is solved recursively by the following
algorithm:
• D0 = D.
• For k = 1 to N , Dk = argmaxd∈Dk−1 Eu(d,ωk).
For instance, if the utility Eu(d,ω1) in the most probable event ω1 is
maximized at a unique decision, that is to say if D1 is a singleton set,
then this decision is the optimal one. If D1 contains several elements, then
searching for the best decision can proceed by leaving aside all decisions
which are not in D1 and going to the next most probable event in order
to distinguish between the elements of D1 and finding D2. The algorithm
proceeds until a single decision is reached, or until all events have been
considered and thus the remaining decisions give the same utility in any
event.
With the above “trembling ballot” model and a large enough number of
voters, it will be proved that the law of lexicographic maximization applies,
so that a voter’s rational behavior is the “lexicographic response” described
in the introduction: candidates are compared to the announced winner, and
the announced winner himself is compared to his most serious contender.
This is the content of Theorem 1. The most probable event (ω1) is that there
is no tie and that my vote makes no diﬀerence; this event leaves availlable
all possible decisions (ballots) and D1 = D0 is the set of all possible ballots.
The second most probable event (ω2) is a tie between the two first-ranked
candidates x1 and x2; in this case, I know which are the good decisions to
take: depending on my preference, I approve of x1 or x2 but not both. This
defines D2, which is a strict subset of D1 but not yet a singleton because I
have not decided yet wether I approve of x3 or not. It will be seen that for all
k ≥ 2, xk appears in the algorithm to be compared to x1, thereby defining
a unique best response. Note that this is not an equilibrium eﬀect: this
strategy actually describes the best response to any strategy profile which
generates no ties in the scores.
The above algorithm is sound from the behavioral point of view. Be-
havioral theories of individual choice often incorporates the idea that actual
choices are obtained after a qualitative and discrete process of simplification
and elimination, rather than after the weighting of probabilities and utilities
which caracterises rational behavior. We refer the interested reader to the
second volume of the classic book Suppes et al. (1989), pages 436-457, and
to Tversky (1972a, 1972b) or Tversky and Sattah (1979). The main argu-
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ment of the present paper is that this “boundedly rational” rule of behavior
is in fact rational if the number of voters is large.
4 Results
We start by a simple lemma which is just the formal description of the
voter’s best responses when there is no uncertainty.
Lemma 1 Suppose a given voter knows how the other voters vote. Let s∗
be the highest score (computed from these other voters votes), let Y1 be the
set of candidates with score s∗, and let Y2 be the set of candidates with score
s∗ − 1 (Y2 can be empty). The best responses for this voter only depend on
Y1 and Y2. Denoting by B = 2X the set of ballots B ⊆ X, let φ(Y1, Y2) ⊆ B
be set of best responses.
• If Y1 = {xi} and Y2 = ∅: φ(Y1, Y2) = 2B.
• If Y1 = {xi, xj}, Y2 = ∅ and the voters prefers xj to xi:
φ(Y1, Y2) = {B ∈ B : xi /∈ B, xj ∈ B} .
• If Y1 = {xi}, Y2 = {xj} and the voters prefers xj to xi:
φ(Y1, Y2) = {B ∈ B : xi /∈ B, xj ∈ B} .
• If Y1 = {xi}, Y2 = {xj} and the voters prefers xi to xj:
φ(Y1, Y2) = B \ {B ∈ B : xi /∈ B, xj ∈ B} .
Proof. Clearly the voter’s behavior only depends on the scores of the
candidates that can get elected, thus the voter can condition her decision
on the diﬀerent possibilities for Y1 and Y2.
If Y1 contains a single candidate and Y2 is empty, then the voter can
have no eﬀect on who is elected so that all ballots are identical for him. One
can write φ(Y1, Y2) = 2B. Consider now the cases with two candidates.
If Y1 = {xi, xj} and Y2 = ∅, then the voter should vote for the candidate
she prefers among xi and xj , say xj , and not for the other one. It does not
matter for her wether she votes or not for any other candidate since they
will not be elected: φ(Y1, Y2) = {B ∈ B : xi /∈ B, xj ∈ B}.
If Y1 = {xi} and Y2 = {xj}, then the voter can have either xi elected or
produce a tie between xi and xj . (1) If she prefers xj to xi, she also prefers
a tie between them to xi winning, so that a best response for her is any
ballot that contains xj and not xi: φ(Y1, Y2) = {B ∈ B : xi /∈ B, xj ∈ B}.
(2) If she prefers xi to xj , she should either vote for both xi and xj , or
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not vote for xj and it does not matter wether or not she votes for any
other candidate. This means that she must avoid ballots that contain xj
and not xi. Her set of best responses is the complement of the previous set:
φ(Y1, Y2) = B \ {B ∈ B : xi /∈ B, xj ∈ B}.
If Y1∪Y2 contains three or more candidates then φ(Y1, Y2) is some subset
of B that we do not need to specify. Notice that, in all cases, the set of best
responses φ(Y1, Y2) does not depend on n.
The next lemma describes how small the probability of a pivotal event
is. To do so, some notation is helpful.
Definition 1 For each non-empty subset Y of candidates, denote by pivot(n, Y )
the event:
∀ y ∈ Y, S(y) ≥ max
x∈X
S(x)− 1
∀ y0 /∈ Y, S(y0) < max
x∈X
S(x)− 1.
Given two subsets Y, Y 0 of X, Y is a more serious race than Y 0 if
lim
n→+∞
Pr [pivot(n, Y 0)]
Pr [pivot(n, Y )]
= 0.
This is denoted
Y 0 ¿ Y.
Lemma 2 Suppose that there are no ties in the score vector s, then the
two-candidate races involving a given candidate xi are ordered:
{xi, xK} ¿ {xi, xK−1} ¿ ...¿ {xi, xi+1} ¿ {xi, xi−1} ¿ ...¿ {xi, x1}.
Moreover, if Y contains three or more candidates then
Y ¿ {xi, xj}
for xi, xj two of them.
(This lemma is proved in the appendix.) Remark that the lemma does
not say, for instance, which one of the two races {x1, x4} and {x2, x3} is the
most serious. The lemma says that {x1, x4} is the most serious among all
the races that involve candidate x4, and this is all what will be needed about
candidate x4, and similarly for the other candidates. We can now state and
prove the key result in this paper.
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Theorem 1 Let s be a score vector with two candidates at the two first
places and no tie: x1 and x2 such that s(x1) > s(x2) > s(y) for y ∈ X,
y 6= x1, x2. There exists n0 such that, for all n > n0 and for all type τ , any
type-τ voter has a unique best-response ballot B∗τ . This ballot is described by
the following rule (the “lexicographic response” to s):
• for τ such that uτ (x1) > uτ (x2), B∗τ = {x ∈ X : uτ (x) ≥ uτ (x1)} ,
• for τ such that uτ (x1) < uτ (x2), B∗τ = {x ∈ X : uτ (x) > uτ (x1)} .
Proof. Suppose first that uτ (x1) > uτ (x2). To prove that B∗τ is the
unique best response, we prove that any other ballot B is not. More precisely,
given B 6= B∗τ , we will find a strictly better response B0 which diﬀers from
B only on one candidate: B0 will be of the form either B0 = B ∪ {x} or
B0 = B \ {x}. Hence the following observation will be very useful.
First point. Let E [uτ (B)] and E [uτ (B0)] denote the expected utility of
strategy B and B0 for a voter i of type τ , given the other voters’ strategies.
Suppose that B0 = B∪{x} for some x /∈ B. Then if the vote of i in favor of x
is not recorded, which was denoted as ηi,x = 0 and happens with probability
ε, voting B0 is the same as voting B, thus:
E
£
uτ (B
0)
¤
= εE [uτ (B)] + (1− ε)E
£
uτ (B
0) | ηi,x = 1
¤
where E
£
uτ (B
0) | ηi,x = 1
¤
denotes the expected utility of casting ballot B0
knowing that there is no mistake in the recording of the approval of candidate
x by voter i. It follows that
E
£
uτ (B
0)− uτ (B)
¤
= (1− ε)E
£¡
uτ (B
0)− uτ (B)
¢ | ηi,x = 1¤ ,
which means that the comparison between B and B0 = B ∪ {x} for a
voter can be made under the assumption that a vote in favor of x would
be recorded for sure. Of course, the same is true when comparing B and
B0 = B \ {x} for x ∈ B. To lighten notation, in the sequel we will forget the
condition and write E [·] for E £· | ηi,x = 1¤.
This first point being made, we shall distinguish three cases, depending
where x1 stands in the voter’s preference and ballot.
(i) Suppose that there exits x ∈ X such that uτ (x) > uτ (x1) and x /∈ B.
Let then B0 = B ∪ {x}.
To compare ballots B and B0, the voter computes the diﬀerence
∆ =
X
Y
Pr[pivot(n, Y )] E
£
uτ (B
0, Y )− uτ (B,Y )
¤
,
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where Euτ (B,Y ) denotes the expected utility for her of choosing ballot B
conditional on the event pivot(n, Y ). The events pivot(n, Y ) with x /∈ Y
have no consequences therefore the sum in ∆ can run over the subsets Y
such that x ∈ Y . Among these is {x, x1}. From Lemma 1, it follows that in
all three cases (Y1 = {x, x1} and Y2 = ∅, Y1 = {x} and Y2 = {x1}, Y1 = {x1}
and Y2 = {x}), the voter’s utility is strictly larger voting for x than not.
Thus E(uτ (B0, {x, x1})− uτ (B, {x, x1})) > 0.
As proved in Lemma 2, the probability of pivot(n, Y ) is decreasing in n
if #Y ≥ 2 in such a way that for all Y ⊆ X with x ∈ Y , Y 6= {x, x1} and
#Y ≥ 2,
lim
n→∞
Pr[pivot(n, Y )]
Pr[pivot(n, {x, x1})] = 0.
One can thus factor out Pr[pivot(n, {x, x1})] in ∆ and write
∆
Pr[pivot(n, {x, x1})] = a+
X
Y 6={x,x1}
#Y≥2
oY (n)
for
a = E
£
uτ (B
0, {x, x1})− uτ (B, {x, x1})
¤
and
oY (n) =
Pr[pivot(n, Y )]
Pr[pivot(n, {x, x1})] E
£
uτ (B
0, Y )− uτ (B,Y )
¤
,
with a being strictly positive and with oY (n) tending to 0 when n tends to
infinity. It follows that, for n large enough, ∆ > 0. This establishes that B
is not a best response, more exactly there exists a number nB,τ depending
on B and τ such that, for all n > nB,τ , B is not a best response. Because
there is a finite number of ballots and types, nB,τ can be chosen independent
of B and τ .
(ii) Suppose that there exists x ∈ X such that uτ (x) < uτ (x1) and x ∈ B.
Let then B0 = B \ {x}. The reasoning is the same as in the previous case:
The relevant events are again pivot(n, Y ) for x ∈ Y, the voter’s utility is
strictly larger not voting for x, and the relevant race is again {x, x1}.
(iii) Suppose that x1 /∈ B. The conclusion follows considering B0 = B∪{x1},
the race {x1, x2} is here relevant and is the most serious one.
From items (i), (ii) and (iii) it follows that the voter’s best response must
satisfy (i) uτ (x) ≥ uτ (x1) if x ∈ B, (ii) uτ (x) ≤ uτ (x1) if x /∈ B, and (iii)
x1 ∈ B. Therefore B∗τ = {x ∈ X : uτ (x) ≥ uτ (x1)} as stated. The argument
is identical in the case uτ (x1) < uτ (x2).
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Notice that the previous result implies that, for n large enough, all voters
of a given type use the same strategy when responding to a score vector that
satisfy the mentioned properties. The next definition is standard in the study
of approval voting.
Definition 2 A ballot B is sincere for a type-τ voter if uτ (x) > uτ (y) for
all x ∈ B and y /∈ B.
As a direct consequence of the previous theorem, one gets the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 For a large electorate, in the absence of tie the best response
is sincere.
It should be emphasized that the previous theorem and corollary are
true even out of equilibrium; they just describe the voter’s response to a
conjecture she holds about the candidate scores. Precisely, the voter takes
into account that she estimates the candidate scores with a statistical distur-
bance of order 1/n. We now turn to equilibrium considerations. The piece
of notation p[x, y] will be used to denote the fraction of voters who prefer x
to y:
p[x, y] =
X
τ : x Pτ y
pτ ,
so that for all x 6= y, p[x, y] + p[y, x] = 1. The number of voters who prefer
x to y is nvp[x, y].
Theorem 2 Let s be a vector with two candidates at the two first places
and no tie: x1 and x2 such that s(x1) > s(x2) > s(y) for y ∈ X, y 6= x1, x2.
There exists n0 such that, for all n > n0, if s is the score vector of an
equilibrium of the game with n voters, then
• the score of the first-ranked candidate is his majoritarian score against
the second-ranked candidate:
s(x1) = p [x1, x2] ,
• the score of any other candidate is his majoritarian score against the
first-ranked candidate:
x 6= x1 ⇒ s(x) = p [x, x1] .
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Proof. This is a direct consequence of Theorem 1. Each voter approves
of x1 if and only of she prefers x1 to x2. For x 6= x1, she approves of x if
and only if she prefers x to x1.
Definition 3 A Condorcet winner at profile p is a candidate x1 such
that p [x1, x] > 1/2 for all x 6= x1. A best contender to a candidate x1 is
a candidate x2 such that p [x2, x1] ≥ p [x, x1] for all x 6= x1.
As it is well known, the existence of a Condorcet winner is a substantial
assumption. On the contrary the assumption that there is a unique best
contender to a candidate x is an innocuous one, inasmuch as one can assume
away exact ties in the preference profile.4
Corollary 2 For a large electorate, if there is an equilibrium with no tie, the
winner of the election is a Condorcet winner. If the preference profile admits
a Condorcet winner and the Condorcet winner has a unique best contender
then the game has a unique equilibrium, in this equilibrium the Condorcet
winner is elected.
Proof. Notice that, as a consequence of Theorem 1, no voter votes
simultaneously for x1 and x2, and each of them votes for either x1 or x2.
Here,
s(x2) = 1− s(x1) < s(x1)
implies s(x2) < 1/2, thus, for x 6= x1
p [x, x1] = s(x) ≤ s(x2) <
1
2
.
These results have a non-trivial implication for the case of a preference
profile with no Condorcet winner, although they do not allow for a complete
characterization of equilibrium in that case. In that case, at equilibrium,
the score vector must exhibit a tie between the two top candidates or be-
tween several second-ranked candidates. Approval voting is not a solution to
the so-called Condorcet paradox. Indeed, approval voting retains the basic
disequilibrium property of majority rule: if there is no Condorcet winner
then any announced winner will be defeated, according to approval vot-
ing, by another candidate, preferred to the former by more than half of the
population.
4Things would be diﬀerent in a model of party competition with endogeneous candidate
positions.
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The key to this result is that, with a large population, voters strategic
thinking has to put special emphasis on pairwise comparisons of candidates,
even if the voting rule itself is not defined in terms of pairwise comparisons.
Therefore a natural avenue of research is to check wether the arguments
here provided in the case of approval voting can be extended to other voting
rules.
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A Appendix: Probabilities of pivotal events
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
When a voter i, in the n-replicate population, wonders whom to approve of,
the pivotal events to be taken into account are the almost ties arising from
the other voters strategies. These events are described either by random
variables of the form Snk Ã B(nvs(k), 1− ε), obtained from nvs(k) votes, or
by random variables eSnk Ã B(nvs(k) − 1, 1 − ε), obtained from nvs(k) − 1
votes; the second case arises if the voters of the same type as i approve of
k at the considered profile. In the first part of the proof (“Computation
in the binomial model”) we will consider that all variables are of the form
Snk . In the second part of the proof (“Environmental invariance”) we will
check that the proof is valid in the general case because the ties arising from
variables Snk or eSnk have the same order of magnitude.
A.1.1 Computation in the binominal model
For an integer n, let Snk , for k = 1, ...,K, be independent binomial random
variables of parameters nvsk and 1− ε:
Snk Ã B(nvs(k), 1− ε)
The probability that Snk = i is:
Pr [Snk = i] = Cinvs(k) (1− ε)i εnvs(k)
for i = 0, ..., nvs(k). To lighten notation, write
ni ≡ nvs(ki).
We suppose that the parameters s(k) are strictly ordered:
s(1) > s(2) > ... > s(K).
First step.We must consider the occurence of ties up to one vote. In a first
step, the event of an exact tie at the top between two candidates. Let k1
and k2 with k1 < k2 such that:
∀k 6= k1, k2 , Snk1 = Snk2 > Snk .
The probability of this event is:
P(n, k1, k2) =
n2X
i=0
Cin1C
i
n2 (1− ε)
2i (1)
×εn1+n2−2i Pr [∀k 6= k1, k2,Snk < i]
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Now consider three candidates:
k1 < k2 < k3.
We will prove that the probability of the race between k1 and k3 is very
small compared to the probability of the race between k1 and k2. Write
P(n, k1, k3) =
n3X
i=0
iX
j=0
Cin1C
i
n3C
j
n2 (1− ε)
2i+j
×εn1+n2+n3−2i−j Pr [∀k 6= k1, k2, k3,Snk < i] .
To decipher this formula: the index i is the value of Snk1 = Snk3 and j the
value of Snk2 .
I claim that, for j < i, Cin3C
j
n2 < C
j
n3C
i
n2 . To see this, write
Cin3C
j
n2
Cjn3C
i
n2
=
n3 (n3 − 1) ... (n3 − i+ 1)
n3 (n3 − 1) ... (n3 − j + 1)
×n2 (n2 − 1) ... (n2 − j + 1)
n2 (n2 − 1) ... (n2 − i+ 1)
=
(n3 − j) ... (n3 − i+ 1)
(n2 − j) ... (n2 − i+ 1)
and notice that for each of the i− j remaining term, n3−u < n2−u, hence
the ratio is smaller than 1.
It follows that if we take again the above formula for and exchange i and
j in Cin2 and C
j
n3 and if we denote
Bn =
n3X
i=0
iX
j=0
Cin1C
i
n2C
j
n3 (1− ε)
2i+j
×εn1+n2+n3−2i−j Pr [∀k 6= k1, k2, k3,Snk < i] ,
we obtain:
P(n, k1, k3) < Bn.
Notice that Bn is a part of the summation that defines P(n, k1, k2):
P(n, k1, k2) =
n2X
i=0
iX
j=0
Cin1C
i
n2C
j
n3 (1− ε)
2i+j
×εn1+n2+n3−2i−j Pr [∀k 6= k1, k2, k3,Snk < i]
= Bn + Cn,
17
where Cn is the same sum for i going from n3 + 1 to n2. One can write:
Bn =
n3X
i=0
Pr
£Snk1 = Snk2 = i¤Pr [∀k 6= k1, k2,Snk < i] ,
Cn =
n2X
i=n3+1
Pr
£Snk1 = Snk2 = i¤Pr [∀k 6= k1, k2,Snk < i] .
Using that Pr [∀k 6= k1, k2,Snk < i] is obviously increasing with i,
Bn < Pr [∀k 6= k1, k2,Snk < n3]
n3X
i=0
Pr
£Snk1 = Snk2 = i¤ ,
Cn > Pr [∀k 6= k1, k2,Snk < n3]
n2X
i=n3+1
Pr
£Snk1 = Snk2 = i¤ .
For ε such that n2 < (1 − ε)n1, Pr
£Snk1 = i¤ is increasing with i for
i ∈ {0, ..., n2}: To check this point, note that for i ≤ (1− ε)n1 − 1,
Pr
£Snk1 = i+ 1¤ = Ci+1n1 (1− ε)i+1 εn1−i−1
Pr
£Snk1 = i+ 1¤
Pr
h
Snk1 = i
i = (n1 − i) (1− ε)
(i+ 1) ε
≥ n1 − i
εn1
≥ εn1 + 1
εn1
> 1.
The inequality n2 < (1−ε)n1 can be written: ε < (vs(k1)−vs(k2))/vs(k1),
and vs(k1) and vs(k2) are two diﬀerent integers smaller than the initial num-
ber of voters v. Therefore this inequality is true for all n for all ε < 1/v.
Under this condition, it follows:
Bn < Pr [∀k 6= k1, k2,Snk < n3] Pr
£Snk1 = n3¤ n3X
i=0
Pr
£Snk2 = i¤ ,
Cn > Pr [∀k 6= k1, k2,Snk < n3] Pr
£Snk1 = n3¤ n2X
i=n3+1
Pr
£Snk2 = i¤
and thus
Bn
Cn
<
Pr
£Snk2 ≤ n3¤
Pr
h
Snk2 > n3
i .
When n tends to infinity, the variable Snk2/n is approximately normal,
with mean µ = (1− ε)vs(k2) and variance ε(1− ε)vs(k2)/n. Like previously,
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ε < 1/v implies that vs(k3) < µ. The weak law of large number implies that
the probability that Snk2/n is less than vs(k3) tends to 0 when n tends to in-
finity, which means here that Pr
£Snk2 ≤ n3¤ tends to 0 and thus Pr £Snk2 > n3¤
tends to 1. Therefore BnCn tends to 0. Recall that P(n, k1, k3) < Bn and
P(n, k1, k2) = Bn + Cn, it follows that
lim
n→∞
P(n, k1, k3)
P(n, k1, k2)
= 0.
Second step. Consider next the event pivot(n, {k1, k2}) of an almost exact
tie at the top between the two candidates k1 and k2 with k1 < k2. This is
the union of the three disjoint events:
∀k 6= k1, k2 , Snk1 = Snk2 > Snk
or ∀k 6= k1, k2 , Snk1 + 1 = Snk2 > Snk
or ∀k 6= k1, k2 , Snk2 + 1 = Snk1 > Snk
Denote by P(n, k1, k2), P0(n, k1, k2), and P00(n, k1, k2) the probabilities of
these three events. For k3 with k1 < k2 < k3, the same reasoning which led
in the first step to limn→∞
P(n,k1,k3)
P(n,k1,k2)
= 0 can be made and leads to the two
same other conclusions limn→∞
P0(n,k1,k3)
P0(n,k1,k2) = 0 and limn→∞
P00(n,k1,k3)
P00(n,k1,k2) = 0.
Therefore limn→∞
P(n,k1,k3)+P0(n,k1,k3)+P00(n,k1,k3)
P(n,k1,k2)+P0(n,k1,k2)+P00(n,k1,k2) = 0 and we obtain that
lim
n→∞
Pr[pivot(n, {k1, k3})]
Pr[pivot(n, {k1, k2})] = 0. (2)
Third step. It remains to show that three-way (or more) ties are negligible
compared to two-way ties. This easy point is left to the reader.
A.1.2 Environmental invariance
Let eSnk Ã B(nvs(k)− 1, 1− ε).
Consider a strategy profile in which type-τ voters approve of candidate k, for
a type τ voter, the number of votes in favor of k is eSnk if this particular voter
decides not to approve of k,.or Snk if he decides to approve of k. We now
check that this feature has no consequence on the voter’s decision because
the ties arising from variables Snk or eSnk have the same order of magnitude.
To see this, consider for instance the event of an exact tie at the top between
k1 and k2 when the score of k1 iseSnk1 Ã B(nvs(k1)− 1, 1− ε)
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and the score of k2 is
Snk2 Ã B(nvs(k2), 1− ε).
The event
∀k 6= k1, k2 , eSnk1 = Snk2 > Snk
has the following probability:
Q(n, k1, k2) =
n2X
i=0
Cin1−1C
i
n2 (1− ε)
2i
×εn1−1+n2−2i Pr [∀k 6= k1, k2,Snk < i]
(we still denote n1 = ns(k1) and n2 = ns(k2)), to be compared with
P(n, k1, k2) in formula 1. Because Cin1−1 < C
i
n1 , it is easy to see that
Q(n, k1, k2) < (1/ε)P(n, k1, k2).
Using the fact that
Cin1 =
n1
n1 − i
Cin1−1 ≤
n1
n1 − n2
Cin1−1,
one can also see that
P(n, k1, k2) < ε
n1
n1 − n2
Q(n, k1, k2).
We thus obtain that, for all n,
ε <
P(n, k1, k2)
Q(n, k1, k2)
< ε
s(k1)
s(k1)− s(k2)
. (3)
We leave to the reader the easy verification of similar formulas for all
events of the form
∀k 6= k1, k2 , bSnk1 = bSnk2 > bSnk ,
where the variables bSnk are equal either to Snk or to eSnk , as well as for the
almost tie events of the form
∀k 6= k1, k2 , bSnk1 + 1 = bSnk2 > bSnk
and
∀k 6= k1, k2 , bSnk2 + 1 = bSnk1 > bSnk .
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From the observation 3 one can deduce that the conclusion 2 that the
race {k1, k3} is negligeable compared to the race {k1, k3} holds for all the
voters, independently of who this voter is voting for. This point plays the
role of the “environmental invariance” property that Myerson obtains with
Poisson random variables. With binomial variables, diﬀerent voters do not
have exactly the same information, but the diﬀerence is so small that it does
not matter for finding best responses.
A.2 A continuous Gaussian model
It may be surprising that we proved our results without using the approx-
imation of binomial distributions by normal distributions. Indeed an early
version of this paper was written systematically using normal approxima-
tions (Laslier 2004). This methodology leads, at rather low cost, to the same
qualitative results, and is also helpful to get intution on this model. Unfor-
tunately, it turns out that the normal approximation is not mathematicaly
correct in the present case. In this appendix, we provide a simple continu-
ous Gaussian, model which looks very much like an approximation of the
discrete model and we explain why this continuous model is in fact not a
correct approximation.
A.2.1 Magnitude of pivotal events in the Gaussian approxima-
tion
Let bk, for k = 1, ...,K, be independent normal random variables. The
mean value of bk is denoted by ak and one supposes a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ... ≥ aK .
The variance of bk is σ2/n, where σ2 is a fixed parameter and n is a (large)
number. All variables bk have the same variance5. For convenience we
denote
aij =
ai + aj
2
.
Definition 4 Given a score vector s, denote by xi, for i = 1, ...,K the
candidates ordered so that s(x1) ≥ s(x2) ≥ ... ≥ s(xK); for i 6= j, the
magnitude of the race {xi, xj} is:
βi,j = lim
n→+∞
1
n
log Pr[pivot(n, {xi, xj})].
5 In the exat model of the text, the variance depends on the score: var= ε(1−ε)s(x)
nv
. The
simplification done here is of no consequence for the point we make in this Appendix.
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Lemma 3 The magnitudes of the two-candidate races involving a given can-
didate xi are ordered:
βi,K < βi,K−1 < ... < βi,i+1 < βi,i−1 < ... < βi,1.
Moreover, if Y contains three or more candidates then
lim
n→+∞
1
n
log Pr[pivot(n, Y )] < βi,j
for xi, xj two of them.
The computations are explained in this appendix under the assumption
that for no i 6= j there exists k such that ak = aij . It is not more diﬃcult to
arrive at the conclusion through the same type of computations in the case
where for some i 6= j there exists k such that ak = aij .
Consider the event pivot(n, {i, j}) of a race between two candidates:
bj ∈ [bi − 1/n, bi + 1/n[ ,
∀k 6= i, j , bk + 1/n < bi,bj
We will prove that
lim
n→+∞
1
n
log Pr [pivot(n, {i, j})] = −
kijX
k=1
1
2σ2
(ak − aij)2 −
(ai − aj)2
4σ2
, (4)
where kij is the last integer k such that ak > aij .
Tie between the two first candidates
To start by the simplest case, consider the event pivot(n, {x1, x2}): It is
the disjoint union of the two events
∀k = 3, ...,K , bk < b1 − 1/n < b2 < b1
and
∀k = 3, ...,K , bk < b2 − 1/n < b1 < b2
The probability of the former writes :Z +∞
b1=−∞
f(b1; a1,
σ2
n
)
Z b1
b2=b1−1/n
f(b2; a2,
σ2
n
)
KY
k=3
F (b1 −
1
n
; ak,
σ2
n
) db2 db1,
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where f and F denote the normal density and cumulative functions
f(t;µ,σ2) =
1√
2σ2π
exp− 1
2σ2
(t− µ)2,
F (t;µ,σ2) =
Z t
u=−∞
f(u;µ,σ2) du.
Because the inner integral on b2:Z b1
b2=b1−1/n
f(b2; a2,σ2/n) db2
is close to 1nf(b1; a2,σ
2/n), the probability of the former event is close to
A12/2, with:
A12 =
2
n
Z +∞
b1=−∞
KY
k=3
F (b1 −
1
n
; ak,
σ2
n
) f(b1; a1,
σ2
n
) f(b1; a2,
σ2
n
) db1.
The same approximation is valid for the complementary event, so that the
probability of the race {i, j} is approximately
Pr [pivot(n, {i, j})] ' A12
The product of two normal densities can be written
f(b1; a2,σ2/n) f(b1; a1,σ2/n)
=
n
2σ2π
exp− n
2σ2
£
(b1 − a1)2 + (b1 − a2)2
¤
=
n
2σ2π
exp− n
σ2
"
(b1 − a12)2 +
(a1 − a2)2
4
#
=
1
2
r
n
σ2π
Ã
exp−n (a1 − a2)
2
4σ2
!
f(b1; a12,
σ2
2n
)
so that one gets:
A12 = α12
Z +∞
b1=−∞
KY
k=3
F (b1 −
1
n
; ak,
σ2
n
) f(b1; a12,
σ2
2n
) db1,
with
α12 =
1√
nσ2π
exp−n (a1 − a2)
2
4σ2
.
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For n large, F (b1 − 1/n; ak,σ2/n) tends to 1 if b1 > ak and to 0 if b1 < ak,
and the density f(b1; a12, σ
2
2n) db1 tends to a Dirac mass at point b1 = a12.
Here ak < a12, so that the integral in A12 tends to 1 and one finally gets:
logA12 ' − n (a1 − a2)
2
4σ2
.
General case
More generally, consider i and j such that 1 < i < j. The probability of
the event pivot(n, {i, j}) is approximately
Aij = αij
Z +∞
bi=−∞
Y
k 6=i,j
F (bi −
1
n
; ak,
σ2
n
) f(bi; aij ,
σ2
2n
) dbi,
with
αij =
1√
nσ2π
exp−n (ai − aj)
2
4σ2
.
One still has that the density f(bi; aij , σ
2
2n) dbi tends to a Dirac mass at
point bi = aij , but now F (aij ; ak,σ2/n) tends to 1 only for those k such
that ak < aij . Denote them by k = kij + 1, kij + 2, ...,K. For k = 1, ..., kij ,
one uses the standard approximation of the tail of the normal distribution.
Recall that, for t >> 1,
1√
2π
Z +∞
t
e−
1
2
u2 du ' 1√
2π
Z +∞
t
e
1
2
t2−tu du
=
1√
2π
e
1
2
t2
Z +∞
t
e−tu du
=
1
t
√
2π
e−
1
2
t2 .
One so gets that for k = 1, ..., kij ,
F (aij ; ak,σ
2/n) =
1
(ak − aij)
r
σ2
2nπ
exp− n
2σ2
(ak − aij)2 .
Then
logAij ' −
kijX
k=1
n
2σ2
(ak − aij)2 −
n (ai − aj)2
4σ2
and the expression (4) follows. The first part of Lemma 3 is easily deduced
from these formulae. The second part of the lemma (about three way ties
or more) is easily obtained by the same arguments.
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A.2.2 A caveat about the Gaussian model
When approximating a binomial distribution by the normal distribution, one
must be careful because the approximation is not valid for arbitrary small
events. But, precisely, the problem under consideration here is to compare
very rare events. The mistake that one does when directly considering a
continuous model is the following.
One considers the binomial variable
Sn Ã B(n, 1− ε)
and a rational number α, and wonders how fast is the probability
pn = Pr [Sn = αn]
going to 0.
The correct answer to this question is found by noting that
pn(α) = Cαnn (1− ε)αnε(1−α)n
and using Stirling’s formula:
lim
n→∞
1
n
log pn(α) = α log [(1− ε)α] + (1− α) log [ε(1− α)] . (5)
For n large, the variable 1nSn is approximately normal with mean (1−ε)
and variance ε(1−ε)n , the density at α of this normal distribution is
fn(α) =
1√
2π
r
n
ε(1− ε) exp
∙
−n(α− (1− ε))
2
ε(1− ε)
¸
so that
lim
n→∞
1
n
log fn(α) = −
(α− (1− ε))2
ε(1− ε) . (6)
Comparing formulas (5) and (6) for the limits of pn(α) and fn(α) one
can see that they are diﬀerent. Reasoning directly in the continuous model
amounts to use (6) when one should use (5).
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